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As the United State healthcare system continues to evolve from a 
reimbursement system based on volume to one based on value, understanding 
the relationship between physician quality metrics such as patient satisfaction 
and clinical quality metrics is extremely important. In order to improve value by 
effectuating behavior change, physician financial incentives must be designed 
based on desired outcomes. Understanding the relationship between 
performance indicators and aligning incentives is integral to successfully 
incentivizing physician behavior change. This study assessed the relationship 
between patient satisfaction and clinical quality in an ambulatory setting and 
vii 
 
determined that they are separate domains, but certain types of clinical quality 





1.    INTRODUCTION 
1.1  BACKGROUND AND NEED 
The United States healthcare delivery system is undergoing significant 
change as a result of the Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act (“ACA”) that 
was signed into law by President Obama in 2010 (Sommers, 2012). While the 
ACA has many provisions that impact various parts of the healthcare system, of 
note is the introduction of accountable care organizations (“ACOs”) and other 
quality based reimbursement structures, which incentivize healthcare providers 
via a “carrot and stick” approach to keep their patients healthier (Gold, 2014). 
Whether or not ACOs and revised financial incentive structures will be successful 
in improving the quality of healthcare provided is yet to be determined. However, 
the very existence of these changes, and the associated regulations, have 
created a transformational process whereby the healthcare reimbursement 
system is evolving from one based on volume (reimbursement for each unit or 
service provided) to one based on value (reimbursement for keeping patients 
healthier and/or meeting quality criteria). In general, value is a measure of the 
output an organization, individual, country or other entity achieves relative to the 
costs that are incurred to create the output (Porter, 2010). In healthcare, value is 
typically defined as the overall health outcomes, or quality of health achieved per 
dollar spent on achieving that outcome (Porter, 2010). It is based on this 
definition that the United States is often seen as one of the lowest value 
healthcare systems in the developed world (Davis, Stremikis, Squires, & and 





(16.2%) of its gross domestic product (“GDP”) on healthcare, which ranked first 
among Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development (“OECD”) 
countries, yet its average life expectancy in 2011 was 78.4 years, which is below 
the OECD average and ranks twenty-sixth of thirty-four OECD countries (OECD, 
2013). Thus, it is understandable why regulations attempting to improve the 
value of the United States healthcare system have been enacted. 
As part of this attempted transition to reimbursement based on value or 
quality from reimbursement based on volume, financial incentives, physician 
reimbursement and overall physician compensation are increasingly becoming 
tied to quality based factors such as patient satisfaction results and performance 
on clinical measures such as those provided by the healthcare effectiveness data 
and information set (HEDIS). There is not currently a clear, consistent 
mechanism by which to measure the quality of healthcare services administered 
by individual physicians and other healthcare providers, nor is there a definitive 
answer to which of the employed measures ultimately impact clinical outcomes. 
However, according to the Medical Group Management Association (“MGMA”), 
the transition is starting to occur where physicians are witnessing their 
reimbursement from payers begin to be linked to performance on patient 
satisfaction results and other clinical performance measures and less based 
strictly on the volume of healthcare services provided (MGMA, 2014). Further, 
according to MGMA, primary care physicians (“PCPs”) indicated that 5.96% of 
their total compensation was linked to quality; and specialists (“SCPs”) noted that 





quality measures in 2013 (MGMA, 2014). Performance on patient satisfaction 
was also cited as a factor of total compensation with PCPs indicating a slight 
increase in the percentage of compensation tied to patient satisfaction in 2013 
over the 2% in 2012; and SCPs stating that an average of 2.31% of their 
compensation was based on performance on patient satisfaction in 2013 
compared to 1.61% that was reported in 2012 (MGMA, 2014). The same survey 
showed the median compensation for PCPs to be $232,989 and for SCPs to be 
$402,233, meaning that for PCPs, average compensation for quality was 
$13,886.14; and for patient satisfaction it was $5824.73. While for SCPs average 
compensation based on quality was $22,927.28; and patient satisfaction was 
$9,291.58 (MGMA, 2014). Other surveys have shown that up to 59% of 
physicians have at least some portion of their compensation tied to patient 
satisfaction results (Zgierska, 2014).  
While there has been significant change in reimbursement to physicians, 
this change has happened in a relatively short period of time. Many commercial 
payers base their reimbursement on Medicare, which was enacted in 1965 when 
President Lyndon B. Johnson signed the Title XVIII Amendment to the 1935 
Social Security Act (Sanaz Hariri, 2007). In 2013, Medicare represented $585.7 
billion in expenditures, which was approximately 20 percent of the total national 
health expenditure (“NHE”) for that year (The Center for Medicare and Medicaid 
Services, 2014). Payments to physicians represented 12% of total Medicare 






(The Henry J. Kaiser Family Foundation, 2014) 
 
From its beginning in 1965, Medicare reimbursed physicians and hospitals 
primarily based on the amounts that were charged, in accordance with the 
methodology of most private insurers at that time, namely Blue Cross and Blue 
Shield (Wilensky, Medicare Physician Payments: Where We've Been; Where We 
Need to Go, 2012). Because reimbursement for Medicare and privately insured 
patients was based on physicians’ or hospitals’ historical charged amounts, there 
was an inherent incentive to progressively increase charges in order to maximize 
revenues (Starr, 1982). It is projected that as a result of allowing physicians to 
increase reimbursement by increasing their charges, the rate of growth in 
spending averaged 13 percent annually from 1967 through 1974 (Holtz-Eakin, 
2004).  The first major change to the Medicare physician reimbursement 
structure came in 1975, with the implementation of the Medicare Economic Index 
(“MEI”), which provided the first type of cap on charge based increases (Dutton, 
1981). Even with the implementation of the MEI to cap charge increases for 
physician services, spending continued to rise drastically from volume increases 





to Go, 2012). In 1992, the resource based relative value scale (“RBRVS”) was 
implemented as the revised physician fee schedule for Medicare (Sanaz Hariri, 
2007). The RBRVS system, developed by researchers at Harvard University 
School of Public Health, placed greater emphasis on the resources necessary to 
perform a procedure and intended to correct the discrepancy that existed 
between payment for interventional and non-interventional services (Sanaz 
Hariri, 2007).  The RBRVS system remains the fundamental reimbursement 
structure for physicians today.  
In almost every year since 2003, Congress has intervened to either grant 
an increase in physician reimbursement or has acted to freeze reimbursement in 
order to prevent a decrease that would have been required by the statutory 
formula associated with the Sustainable Growth Rate (“SGR”) (Health Affairs, 
2013) with the SGR finally being repealed by the Medicare Access and CHIP 
Reauthorization Act of 2015 (“MACRA”).The increases in spending, failure of the 
SGR and the recognition that the current reimbursement system does not reward 
quality are all factors that have contributed to the movement toward a revised, 
value-based system (Sanghavi, 2013).  
Clearly, a revision to the Medicare physician reimbursement structure has 
been needed for quite some time. However, the push toward reimbursement tied 
to value as opposed to being tied to volume can largely be attributed to the 
changing market dynamics from provisions of the ACA. While the vast legislation 





significant cost containment and health delivery reform provisions. Specifically, 
the ACA includes requirements such as 
 “Allow providers organized as ACOs that voluntarily meet quality 
thresholds to share in the cost savings they achieve for the Medicare 
program. To qualify as an ACO, organizations must agree to be 
accountable for the overall care of their Medicare beneficiaries, have 
adequate participation of primary care physicians, define processes to 
promote evidence-based medicine, report on quality and costs, and 
coordinate care. (Shared savings program established January 1, 2012)” 
(The Henry J. Kaiser Family Foundation, 2013)  
 “Create an Innovation Center within the Centers for Medicare and 
Medicaid Services to test, evaluate, and expand in Medicare, Medicaid, 
and CHIP different payment structures and methodologies to reduce 
program expenditures while maintaining or improving quality of care. 
Payment reform models that improve quality and reduce the rate of cost 
growth could be expanded throughout the Medicare, Medicaid, and CHIP 
programs. (Effective January 1, 2011)” (The Henry J. Kaiser Family 
Foundation, 2013).  
 “Establish a hospital value-based purchasing program in Medicare to pay 
hospitals based on performance on quality measures and extend the 
Medicare physician quality reporting initiative beyond 2010. (Effective 





The underlying theme of the cost containment and health system 
performance sections of the ACA is that reimbursement should be tied to 
quality and outcomes. And, in an historic announcement in early 2015 HHS 
indicated that it had established the goal and framework to increase 
payments tied to quality or value through alternative payment models to 30 
percent of traditional Medicare payments by the end of 2016, and 50 percent 
of payments to models such as ACOs or bundled payments by the end of 
2018 (The U.S. Department of Health and Human Services, 2015). In addition 
to the ACO models and bundled payment options, the value based payment 
incentives and penalties for physicians, some of which began before the ACA 
but were solidified or made permanent by the ACA, currently include 
Meaningful Use (“MU”) (and the previous electronic prescribing incentive), 
Physician Quality Reporting System (“PQRS”) and the Value Based Payment 
Modifier (“VBPM”) (The Center for Medicare and Medicaid Services, 2015).  
 The MU program was initially designed to incentivize providers to 
implement electronic health records (“EHR” or “EHRs”). There are 
multiple stages of MU with the maximum incentive that an eligible 
professional could receive being $44,000 over the five year period 
(The Center for Medicare and Medicaid Services, 2015). In 2015, the 
penalty phase of MU was implemented with downward payment 
adjustments to providers that are eligible but decide not to participate 
in the MU program of 1-2% depending on their electronic prescribing 





maximum penalty for failure to meet MU will reach 5% of the Medicare 
physician fee schedule amount by 2019 (The Center for Medicare and 
Medicaid Services, 2014). The detailed MU measures include core 
measures such as maintaining an active medication list, providing 
patients with an electronic copy of their health information and 
providing clinical summaries for patients at each office visit, among 
others; menu measures such as sending reminders to patients for 
preventive/follow-up care or submitting data to immunization registries;  
and clinical quality measures such as blood pressure measurement for 
hypertension or adult weight screening and follow-up among others 
(The Center for Medicare and Medicaid Services, 2015). There is a 
significant component related to patient communication and outreach 
in addition to systems capabilities and clinical quality.  
 The PQRS program is a reporting program that uses a combination of 
incentive payments and negative payment adjustments to promote 
reporting of quality information by eligible professionals (“EPs”). The 
program provides an incentive payment to practices with EPs that 
satisfactorily report data on quality measures for covered Physician 
Fee Schedule (PFS) services furnished to Medicare Part B Fee-for-
Service beneficiaries (The Center for Medicare and Medicaid Services, 
2015). For 2015, there are 255 measures included in PQRS (The 
Center for Medicare and Medicaid Services, 2015). Measures come 





Committee for Quality Assurance’s (“NCQA”) HEDIS and other medical 
specialty societies. There are six (6) domains, which include 
communication and care coordination, community/population health, 
effective clinical care, efficiency and cost reduction, patient safety; and 
person and caregiver-centered experience and outcomes (The Center 
for Medicare and Medicaid Services, 2015). Most practices are 
required to report nine (9) or more measures across at least three (3) 
different domains (The Center for Medicare and Medicaid Services, 
2015). Some of the requirements vary depending on the size of the 
group participating; and whether or not the participant is part of an 
ACO. For those EPs that elect not to participate in PQRS, the penalty 
in 2015 is 2% of their Medicare PFS. 
 The VBPM was instituted in The ACA which “requires that Medicare 
establish a value-based payment modifier that provides for differential 
payment under the Medicare PFS based upon the quality of care 
furnished compared to cost during a performance period. It requires 
that the Value Modifier be applied to specific physicians and groups of 
physicians determined as appropriate starting January 1, 2015, and to 
all physicians and groups of physicians by January 1, 2017. The 
statute requires the Value Modifier to be budget neutral. Budget 
neutrality means that, in aggregate, the increased payments to high 
performing physicians and groups of physicians equal the reduced 





Center for Medicare and Medicaid Services, 2015). The VBPM is 
closely linked to PQRS and provides additional incentive or penalty 
based on PQRS performance and reporting. The VBPM does not apply 
to participants in a Medicare ACO as they have other financial 
incentives and reporting requirements that vary from the general 
physician population (The Center for Medicare and Medicaid Services, 
2015).  
Under MACRA, these incentive and penalty models were consolidated 
under the newly created Merit-Based Incentive Payment System (“MIPS”) 
beginning in 2019. Additionally, two different tracks were enacted, the MIPS track 
and the Alternative Payment Models (“APM”) track (The Center for Medicare and 
Medicaid Services, 2015). MIPS is a budget neutral model that has incentives for 
EHR (meaningful use measures) weighted at 25%, Quality (PQRS measures) 
weighted at 30%, Resource Use (Cost measures) weighted at 30%, and Clinical 
Improvement (care coordination, patient satisfaction and access measures) 
weighted at 15% (The Center for Medicare and Medicaid Services, 2015). 
Physicians may opt out of MIPS if they opt for the APM track that requires 
participation in two-sided risk based models, quality measurement and potentially 
Patient Centered Medical Home (“PCMH”) (The Center for Medicare and 
Medicaid Services, 2015). The trend in reimbursement for physician services is 
clearly in the direction of reimbursement and incentives tied to clinical quality, 
patient satisfaction and overall cost control; and incentives are being enacted 





There has been significant research as to the impact of financial 
incentives on improving quality in healthcare. For example, a study of the 
Premier Hospital Quality Incentive Demonstration project found that hospitals in 
the demonstration initially showed positive improvements in quality compared to 
a control group. However, the effects did not last, and at the five-year point of the 
demonstration, there were no significant differences in performance scores 
between participating hospitals and the comparison group of hospitals (Werner, 
2011). However, other studies have demonstrated different results. Researchers 
at Dartmouth College and the National Bureau for Economic Research (“NBER”) 
assessed results of the Medicare Physician Group Practice Demonstration, a 
pilot project put forth by the Center for Medicare and Medicaid Services (“CMS”) 
that ran from 2005 to 2010. In the pilot program, physicians from ten large 
practices received bonuses for meeting lower cost growth than local controls and 
for meeting quality targets (Colla, 2012). The study showed an improvement in 
quality but a less significant impact on the growth of spending (Colla, 2012).   
The healthcare industry is composed of many financial incentives, 
oftentimes competing, including the manner in which physicians are paid, the 
reimbursement weights for certain services; and in the ways health insurance 
coverage, co-payments, and deductibles are structured for patients, among 
others (Loewenstein, 2012). While the literature remains mixed as to the impact 
of financial incentives on transforming physician behavior related to quality 
improvement and administrative processes (Health Affairs: Health Policy Briefs, 





self-interested utility maximizers and would respond to financial incentives 
(Loewenstein, 2012). Additionally, behavioral economics tells us that in certain 
cases, individuals lack information to make rational decisions, and at other times 
they appear to act contrary to their own known interests, such as when 
individuals overeat, decline to take a medication, or opt not to wear seat belts 
(Loewenstein, 2012).  
Following the logic that physicians will respond to financial incentives, 
many experts remain critical of performance incentives tied to patient satisfaction 
because the things that “satisfy” patients may not be in their best interest (Pho, 
2012). An often cited example is that of antibiotics or pain medications 
(Sonnenberg, 2014). In both instances, there is information asymmetry between 
the physician and the patient. The patient may think they “need” antibiotics, or 
they may “want” pain medications, but neither may be the best clinical practice 
depending on the situation. Physicians have the information to make the best 
determination, but patient satisfaction results could be harmed and ultimately 
their compensation impacted if they deviate from what the patient desires.  
The topic of information asymmetry and uncertainty in healthcare is not 
new. In Kenneth Arrow’s seminal paper Uncertainty and the Welfare Economics 
of Medical Care (1963) he explained that “uncertainty as to the quality of the 
product is perhaps more intense here (medical care industry) than in any other 
important commodity” (p. 951) (Arrow, 1963). Physicians are our most educated 
and highly trained medical professionals, thereby creating an information 





information asymmetry may vary across physician-patient relationships, generally 
speaking, it may be difficult for patients to assess the quality of the medical care 
that they receive from a physician due to the inherent uncertainty related to 
information asymmetry. It has been shown that when information regarding 
quality isn’t available before consumers make a purchase, quality may 
deteriorate to the lowest level in the market (Akerlof, 1970). Basically, (Akerlof, 
1970) showed that since purchasers cannot tell the difference between high 
quality used cars and lemons (poor quality used cars), all used cars sell for the 
same price, regardless of quality (Haas-Wilson, 2001). Accordingly, owners of 
high quality used cars have no incentive to sell their cars and only low quality 
used cars (lemons) are sold (Haas-Wilson, 2001). Luckily, we have not 
witnessed this sort of “race to the bottom” with regard to physician services, 
primarily because in the market for physician services, quality is at least partially 
endogenous and physicians have control over the quality of service that they sell; 
and patients can obtain some information about quality of a physician, or at least 
perceived signals of quality such as word-of-mouth referrals (Haas-Wilson, 
2001). Over time, however, signals of quality can become ineffective (Haas-
Wilson, 2001). Since Arrow’s time, access to medical information has expanded 
significantly, primarily due to the internet. It is hoped that improved access to 
medical information could generate more informed healthcare consumers who 






1.2 PROBLEM STATEMENT 
The ACA has put forth multiple policy changes designed to change 
healthcare provider behavior. Specifically, hospitals are already experiencing 
Medicare reimbursement tied to patient satisfaction results; and Medicare 
physician reimbursement is directly impacted by patient satisfaction results as 
well. Commercial payers are at varying stages of factoring patient satisfaction 
into reimbursement models. Additionally, various quality measures have been 
incorporated into physician compensation and reimbursement, most often 
measures related to performance on HEDIS. Because there is not a common 
methodology for measuring patient satisfaction or defining quality, there is limited 
data that assesses the relationship between patient satisfaction and quality of 
care provided by physicians in the ambulatory setting. It is not known whether 
clinical, technical quality (as measured by described indicators) is a determinant 
of patient satisfaction. Thus, it is difficult to develop appropriate financial 
incentives when the implications are not fully understood. This study’s objective 
is to assess the association between patient satisfaction and physician clinical 
quality, specifically whether patient satisfaction results are a signal for physician 
quality and whether performance on quality measures is a predictor of overall 
patient satisfaction.  
1.3 RESEARCH QUESTIONS AND RESEARCH HYPOTHESES 
Are patients able to recognize clinical technical quality and thus they are 
more satisfied with physicians that perform better on quality metrics? Or, are 






Hypothesis 1: There is no relationship between patient satisfaction scores and 
physician performance on global quality metrics. 
Hypothesis 2: There is no relationship between patient satisfaction scores and 
physician performance on clinical metrics related to antibiotic prescribing 
practice. 
Hypothesis 3: There is no relationship between patient satisfaction scores and 
physician performance on preventive healthcare quality metrics. 
Hypothesis 4: There is no relationship between patient satisfaction scores and 
physician performance on chronic disease management metrics. 
Hypothesis 5: There is no relationship between patient satisfaction scores and 
physician generic prescribing practice metrics. 
Hypothesis 6: There is no relationship between patient satisfaction scores and 
physician performance on vaccine related healthcare quality metrics. 
1.4 INTENDED POPULATION 
 Assessing this relationship will help to determine whether there is 
congruence between quality performance and patient perceived quality in the 
way of satisfaction and therefore provide insight to appropriate financial incentive 
structures for physicians. Ultimately, by more clearly understanding the 
relationship between patient satisfaction and physician clinical quality, more 
informed policy decisions could be made to incentivize appropriate behavior. This 
information could be useful to payers, provider organizations and policy makers 







2. LITERATURE REVIEW 
2.1 PHYSICIAN COMPENSATION AND INCENTIVES 
In total physician penalties related to quality and performance will reach 7-
9% of the Medicare PFS depending on group size by 2017 (The Center for 
Medicare and Medicaid Services, 2015). These incentive and penalty programs 
are designed based on the general underlying microeconomic theory that 
physicians are profit maximizers and thus will respond to incentives (Pauly, 
1978). It has been shown that physicians dictate quantity and specifically, the 
treatment that the patient requires and often make this decision based on factors 
that affect the physician (McGuire T. , 2000). After controlling for normal demand-
side variables, including demand-price, income and clinical need, supply of care 
variables including price, physician attitudes and partnership incentives directly 
influence what happens to the patient in terms of treatment (Gaynor, 1995). In 
fact, the discussion of the impact that financial incentives have on physician 
behavior has been widely debated and investigated both in economics and 
healthcare related disciplines (Shafrin J. , 2010).  
Determining whether physicians are perfect agents for their patients, 
meaning they make medical decisions solely based on what is best for the 
patient; or whether physicians act as “homo economicus”, meaning they are strict 
profit maximizers is integral to the discussion of incentives (Shafrin J. , 2011). 
The most recognized study on the impact of financial incentives on medical 





of the HIE was to assess how much more medical care people would use if it 
was free and what the consequences for their health were (RAND Health, 2015). 
However, a sub-part of the study randomly assigned households to Fee-For-
Service (“FFS”) and capitated plans, allowing research on reimbursement 
methodologies and healthcare utilization. Manning, et al (1987) showed that 
members of capitated plans had 72% of the total expenditures of members in 
FFS plans (Manning, 1987). Other studies have supported these results 
(Hickson, 1987) (Shen, 2004). Shafrin (2010) showed that when surgeons are 
compensated on a FFS basis as opposed to capitation, surgical rates were 78% 
higher, even after controlling for adverse selection. These studies provide 
evidence that financial incentives influence physician behavior, however, the 
available studies focus on the mechanism of reimbursement, i.e. fee-for-service 
or capitation versus incentives directed at certain quality metrics or service 
indicators.  
The overall analysis and understanding of physician payment is covered 
within the economic literature on contracts and incentives, referred to as agency 
theory (Milgrom, 1992). The underpinning of incentive contracts is that the effort 
put forth by an individual or organization (the principal) is used to induce and 
incentivize behaviors by another individual or organization (the agent) (Robinson, 
2001). The various methods of payment to physicians represent a form of an 
incentive contract which links the physician to a larger organization such as a 
medical group, insurance company or other employer (hospital, etc.) (Robinson, 





up their own incentives for physician behavior (Robinson, 2001). The three main 
categories are fee-for-service (retrospective), capitation (prospective) and salary 
(Robinson, 2001). As previously indicated, Medicare reimburses for physician 
services largely on a fee-for-service basis, as do many commercial payers. 
However, as the healthcare system has evolved, various forms of blended 
reimbursement and compensation methodologies have developed, but fee-for-
service has remained a dominant method (Robinson, 2001).  
The structure of physician reimbursement and compensation is complex 
and the failures of the available core methodologies have led to increasing hybrid 
based methodologies such as those that attempt to reward quality in terms of 
outcomes and patient experience or satisfaction. The focus is around the 
structure of payment which links compensation with measures of performance 
(Robinson, 2001) with the ultimate goal of changing physician behavior to 
improve overall healthcare value. According to Robinson (2001, p. 155-156) 
there are four distinctive physician behaviors that revised payment 
methodologies attempt to persuade:  
 Physician Productivity and Patient Service: Healthcare is ultimately 
a service industry, which promotes physicians being productive in 
order to provide the service and to be attentive to the needs and 






 Risk Acceptance: Physicians should accept and care for the sickest 
patients just as they do the well patients. They should not be 
encouraged to avoid the chronically ill, time intensive patients. Fee-
for-service also performs well in incenting these behaviors. 
 Efficiency and Appropriate Scope of Practice: Physicians should be 
encouraged to consider cost-benefit and balance their 
recommendations considering the most appropriate service in the 
most appropriate location dependent on patient needs. Efficiency 
measures would not support over or under utilization. Fee-for 
service and capitation each have their strengths and weaknesses in 
this regard, fee-for-service encouraging supplier-induced demand 
and capitation promoting the right care at the right time and 
location, but also encouraging under-utilization. 
 Cooperation, Evidence-Based Medicine and Outcomes: The US 
Healthcare system is fragmented, lacks communication and 
integration. Physicians should be encouraged to collaborate, 
coordinate care and focus on evidence-based medicine to promote 
optimal clinical outcomes. Fee-for-service does not compensate for 
these types of activities, thus making it counterproductive, and 
capitation offers some potential for focusing on “epidemiological 
patterns of illness” and resource conservation, but falls short of 





Research on the implications of reimbursing physicians based on quality 
metrics is a newer concept and is much more limited. Flodgren, et al (2011) 
found that financial incentives were ineffective in improving compliance with 
guidelines and that “target payments and bonuses” did not improve compliance 
with guidelines (Flodgren, 2011). Scott, et al (2011) showed that evidence on the 
use of financial incentives as it related to improvements in the quality of primary 
care was inconclusive (Scott, 2011). Still others have shown that results are 
mixed, specifically that with regard to impact of pay for performance on clinical 
effectiveness, there is a range from negative or no effect to positive effect, 
dependent on the measure and program (Van Herck, 2010). Christianson (2007) 
also showed mixed results with limited evidence to support financial incentives 
targeted at improving quality but a few significant impacts were reported 
(Christianson, 2007). Others in the field of behavioral economics have shown 
that financial rewards can undermine motivation and have a detrimental impact 
on performance when the task is cognitively complex, ultimately suggesting that 
pay-for-performance programs may have an unintended negative consequence 
(Himmelstein, 2014). Li, et al (2014) found a moderate response to financial 
incentives and that physicians responded to financial incentives for certain 
services (such as pap smears, mammograms, colorectal cancer screening and 
senior flu shots) but not for others (toddler immunizations) and recommended 
that financial incentives designed to improve quality performance proceed with 





2.2 ASYMMETRIC INFORMATION 
In addition to the financial incentives and penalties that are hoped to 
change physician behavior in order to drive changes in healthcare delivery, CMS 
and many commercial payers have instituted transparency of the available 
pricing and performance information. Specifically, CMS has implemented its 
Hospital Compare (http://www.medicare.gov/hospitalcompare/search.html) and 
Physician Compare (http://www.medicare.gov/physiciancompare/search.html) 
websites, which allows consumers (patients) to view information on certain 
quality and cost measures across providers. Figure 2 shows an example of a 
clinical measure and patient satisfaction result for a selected Medicare ACO from 
the physician compare website. Reporting requirements, and thus data 
availability, differ depending on whether or not a physician participates in a 
Medicare ACO, but information on the MU program and PQRS participation is 
generally available via the Physician Compare website for all physicians.  
Figure 2 
(The Center for Medicare and Medicaid Services, 2015) 
Quality Measure Performance Rate 
Hemoglobin A1c Control (HbAlc) (< 8 percent) 
60% 
Percentage of patients ages 18 to 75 years of age 
with diabetes mellitus who had HbA1c < 8.0 
percent. 
Patients' Rating of Doctor 
94% 
Using any number from 0 to 10, where 0 is the worst 
provider possible and 10 is the best provider 







Transparency of information related to price and quality is extremely 
important in order for the market to function properly. In microeconomics, it is 
typically assumed that there is perfect information in the market being assessed. 
By perfect information, economists mean that the consumers and producers of a 
product or service each have complete information on the price and quality of the 
goods or services under consideration; or that consumers are as well informed 
about the product or service as the seller (Folland, 2006). Healthcare clearly 
suffers from a lack of perfect information in that information on price and quality 
are often unavailable, and that information is often asymmetric. There are many 
issues related to asymmetric information in the healthcare market, such as 
adverse selection and agency problems. For purposes of this section, the focus 
will be on agency related to asymmetric information, specifically those situations 
where there is asymmetric information between physicians and patients leading 
to an agency problem.  
As initially explained by Arrow (1963, p. 951) “Uncertainty as to the quality 
of the product is perhaps more intense here than in any other important 
commodity…because medical knowledge is so complicated, the information 
possessed by the physician as to the consequences and possibilities of 
treatment is necessarily very much greater than that of the patient, or at least so 
it is believed by both parties. Further, both parties are aware of this informational 
inequality and their relation is colored by this knowledge.” For example, 
oftentimes in the physician-patient relationship the patient has significantly less 





benefits of treatments, the cost of treatment and the quality of the provider 
offering the treatment (Folland, 2006). If a patient seeks the services of a 
physician for a sore throat, they trust the physician to choose the right course of 
treatment based on the physician’s knowledge of whether the sore throat is 
caused by a virus or bacteria and other patient specific factors. The patient does 
not have the information to determine whether or not the physician chose the 
best course of treatment. This leads to the agency relationship.  
By definition, an agency relationship is a relationship “formed whenever a 
principal (for example, a patient) delegates decision-making authority to another 
party, the agent. In the physician-patient relationship, the patient (principal) 
delegates authority to the physician (agent), who in many cases also will be the 
provider of the recommended services. The motive behind this delegation of 
authority is that the principals recognize that they are relatively uninformed about 
the most appropriate decisions to be made and that the deficiency is best 
resolved by having an informed agent” (Folland, 2006) p. 207. Given this 
scenario, we would expect a perfect agent to make medical decisions as the 
patient would make decisions for themselves if they had the same information 
that the physician has (Folland, 2006). Under this principal-agent structure, the 
role of the agent (physician) is to maximize the utility of the principal (patient) 
within available resources (Vick, Agency in Health Care: Examining Patients' 
Preferences for Attributes of the Doctor-Patient Relationship, 1998). Thus, 
physicians must include the utility of their patients’ desire for quality healthcare 





becomes the possibility that these two objectives in a physician’s behavioral 
model (the patients’ utility derived from quality healthcare and the physician’s 
utility derived from profit maximization) may be in conflict depending on 
incentives and payment system structures within the market (Dwyer, 2012). 
Thus, clarity of the efficiency of final outcomes is often clouded (Dwyer, 2012). 
The information asymmetry and principal-agent problem between physicians and 
patients has been recognized as one of the fundamental market failures in 
healthcare (Smith, 2005), in the words of Arrow (1963), specifically “a failure to 
reach an optimal state in the sense of Pareto” (947).  
 Medical care is essentially a market for information, that is, patients are 
seeking information and advice from physicians that they cannot ascertain on 
their own (Haas-Wilson, 2001). However, once the information is delivered, there 
are also questions to be answered about appropriate clinical interventions 
(Smith, 2005). Pauly (1978) developed a classification system of physician 
services and explained there are “diagnostic”, “prescriptive-informative” and 
“active-therapeutic” services. Further, he explained “administration of an 
injection, surgical procedure or a normal delivery” are examples of active-
therapeutic care, which is more of a skill than exchange of information (Pauly, 
1978). The physician’s knowledge and information is, however, necessary as a 
precursor to any therapeutic treatment. Markets for information have been 
extensively researched by economists and it is generally recognized that these 
markets have specific peculiarities that lead to inefficiencies and failures in the 





of information often have difficulty capturing the returns on the information they 
provide”, “buyers of information rarely know the value of the information until after 
it is purchased and sometimes never at all” and “buyers of a product often have 
less information about the product’s value (price and/or quality) than do its 
sellers” (Haas-Wilson, 2001) (p.1034). The market failure related to sellers 
having difficulty capturing returns on information is diminished by the patient 
specificity of the information, but the issue of lack of quality information prior to 
purchase is very pronounced in the market for healthcare services (Haas-Wilson, 
2001).  
It has been shown in the economics literature that in markets where 
quality information is unavailable prior to purchase, quality is reduced to the 
lowest level in the market (Akerlof, 1970). Further, (Leland, 1979) showed that 
quality is reduced to the lowest level in those markets where price is available 
without cost to the consumer, quality information is unavailable and price and 
quality are unrelated. Fortunately, this race to the bottom in terms of quality in the 
market for physician services has not occurred (Haas-Wilson, 2001). This is 
predominantly because in the market for physician services (as opposed to used 
cars in the Akerlof model), quality is somewhat endogenous because physician 
have some control over the quality of the service they are providing (Haas-
Wilson, 2001). Further, unlike the Akerlof model where consumers were unable 
to obtain any information on quality prior to purchase, patients are able to obtain 
at least limited information on quality through word of mouth, past experiences, 





information made available over the internet. Even before the increasing 
availability of quality information and scorecards, Arrow recognized that a 
consumer or patient may not be able to observe whether or not “the physician is 
using his knowledge to the best advantage” (Arrow, 1963, p. 965) but the 
consumer can get at least some information about quality before making a 
purchasing decision through different signals provided by the physician or other 
sources (Haas-Wilson, 2001). For example, consumers could assume that 
physicians who work the longest hours, or physicians that it takes longer to gain 
an appointment with are of higher quality because they have more patients 
(Haas-Wilson, 2001). Thus work hours or appointment availability could be a 
signal of quality (Haas-Wilson, 2001). However, the “rat race” dynamic erodes 
the accuracy of these signals when lower quality physicians recognize that 
worked hours or appointment availability serve as a signal of quality and they 
adjust their hours or appointment availability accordingly (Haas-Wilson, 2001). 
Even with access to at least limited information on quality, it is still possible for 
quality to diminish (Haas-Wilson, 2001). If high prices are used as a signal of 
high quality, “dishonest firms” could sell lower quality products at higher than 
market prices (Cooper, 1984). This phenomena has also been demonstrated by 
(Chen, 1982) where it was shown that when asymmetric information occurs, 
even if price and quality information are available, consumers could still be 
charged higher prices for low quality services (Haas-Wilson, 2001). The key to an 
efficient market is the availability of reliable data on price and quality. As shown 





regard to delivery of high quality services so long as prices are sufficiently above 
costs (Klein, 1981). Thus, by making information on quality more readily 
available, it is the goal of healthcare reform policies that more informed 
consumers will be able to make better decisions as to their choice of healthcare 
providers, meaning they will select the provider with the lowest quality-adjusted 
prices (Haas-Wilson, 2001). Another positive outcome of increased transparency 
of price and quality information is that physicians and other providers will 
decrease their quality-adjusted prices either by decreasing prices or improving 
quality (Haas-Wilson, 2001).  
2.3 LINK BETWEEN PATIENT SATISFACTION AND CLINICAL 
QUALITY  
 Patient satisfaction and patient preferences with their physicians have 
been extensively studied in the available research from many different aspects. 
For example, Godager (2012) showed that overall, patients prefer physicians that 
are similar to themselves in observable characteristics (Godager, 2012). Vick and 
Scott (1998) showed that the most important attribute to patients was the ability 
to talk to their doctor, and choosing their own treatment was the least important 
element (Vick, 1998). Still others have assessed patient’s abilities to ascertain 
technical quality of care and found that “patients’ assessments are not a 
sufficient basis for assessing the technical quality of their primary care” (Rao, 





Studies on the relationship between patient satisfaction and physician 
quality performance are limited, primarily because much of the data is relatively 
new in the provider realm; and there is a lack of consistent methodology for 
assessing quality. In support of linking physician payment to patient satisfaction 
data, studies have shown a relationship between patient perceptions of their 
physician and overall outcomes such as adherence, satisfaction, trust, health 
status change and symptom resolution (Franks, 2006). Zolnierek (2009) showed 
the link between patient satisfaction and improved adherence to physician 
recommendations (Zolnierek, 2009). On the other hand, researches have shown 
that patients often request elective services that offer limited benefit based on 
marketing or other non-medically evident motives; and physicians often honor 
such requests to improve patient satisfaction (Kravitz, 2005). And, research has 
shown that in cases where physicians’ compensation is more heavily tied to 
patient satisfaction, physicians are more likely to order elective testing such as 
advanced imaging services for back pain (Pham, 2009).  
Still others have challenged whether or not patients are able to ascertain 
technical quality, questioning whether emphasizing patient satisfaction is 
detrimental to clinical treatment decisions. Lembke (2013) explains, “In some 
institutions, patient-survey ratings can affect physicians’ reimbursement and job 
security. When I asked a physician colleague who regularly treats pain how he 
deals with the problem of using opioids in patients who he knows are abusing 
them, he said, “Sometimes I just have to do the right thing and refuse to 





rating.” His “sometimes” seems to imply that at other times he knowingly 
prescribes opioids to abusers because not doing so would adversely affect his 
professional standing. If that’s the case, he is by no means alone” (Lembke, 
2013) p. 36.  
One of the most significant recent studies showed that among those 
patients with the highest patient satisfaction scores, there was a lower odds of 
visiting the emergency department, a higher odds of inpatient admission, 
increased total expenditures (relative to less satisfied patients), increased 
prescription drug expenditures and higher overall mortality (Fenton, 2012). The 
study by Fenton, et al (2012) assessed the relationship between patient 
satisfaction and healthcare utilization, expenditures and outcomes as opposed to 
quality in terms of defined metrics such as HEDIS. Using the Medical 
Expenditure Panel Survey (“MEPS”), mortality follow-up data and results of the 
Consumer Assessment of Heath Plans Survey, Fenton, et al (2012) conducted a 
prospective cohort study in which they estimated the association between patient 
satisfaction and healthcare utilization based on emergency department visits and 
inpatient admissions, healthcare expenditures in total and for just prescription 
drugs and mortality during a period of 3.9 years of follow-up. Fenton, et al (2012) 
adjusted for patient demographics such as age, sex, race/ethnicity, census 
region, household income and education level among others. They also 
considered insurance status of the patient, chronic disease burden, overall health 
status and availability of a usual source of care. Patient satisfaction results were 





quality metrics available, it did show that patients in the highest patient 
satisfaction quartile were less likely to have an emergency room visit, which is a 
positive effect of patient satisfaction but of concern was that Fenton, et al (2012) 
also found that more satisfied patients are more likely to have an inpatient 
admission, have higher total health and prescription drug spending and have an 
increased risk of mortality.  
Similar to the Fenton, et al (2012) study, Sacks, et al (2015) assessed 
hospital patient satisfaction as it relates to outcomes, however, their study was 
focused on surgical outcomes (Sacks, 2015). Specifically, they used the 
American College of Surgeons National Surgical Quality Improvement Project 
(“ACS NQIP”) data along with Medicare inpatient claims, the American Hospital 
Association annual survey and patient satisfaction results retrieved from Hospital 
Compare to assess post-operative mortality, major complications, minor 
complications, failure to rescue and readmissions relationship with patient 
satisfaction. Sacks, et al (2015) used a global patient satisfaction composite for 
their dependent variable, aggregating the results from the HCAHPS questions 
“the number of patients reporting that they would recommend the hospital to 
family or friends” and “the number of patients giving the hospital a global rating of 
9 or 10 out of 10” and assigning hospitals too quartiles based on satisfaction 
scores (Sacks, 2015 p.E3). The authors did find a statistically significant 
relationship between patient satisfaction quartile and 30 day mortality as well as 
failure to rescue and minor complications. Specifically, patients treated at the 





within 30 days, an 18% lower odds of failure to rescue and a 13% lower odds of 
minor complications (Sacks, 2015). However, the relationships were not always 
linear. For the findings related to mortality and failure to rescue, “the lowest risk-
adjusted rates were noted in the second highest quartile, with slightly higher 
rates (although not statistically significantly higher) in the highest quartile (Sacks, 
2015) p. E5. The study did not show a statistically significant relationship 
between patient satisfaction and major complications or patient satisfaction and 
readmissions (Sacks, 2015). The authors concluded that “patient satisfaction 
may fall into a different domain of heath care quality from other surgical quality 
metrics” (Sacks, 2015) p. E5. 
 Other studies have looked more directly at the relationship between 
patient satisfaction results and clinical technical quality. For example, (Farley, 
2014) found that “current evidence demonstrates that patient satisfaction is not a 
validated proxy for quality” (p. 354). Farley, et al (2014) conducted a literature 
review to assess the relationship between patient satisfaction and clinical quality. 
Studies assessed included hospital quality, nursing quality and physician quality 
among others, for a total of 26 studies reviewed. They ultimately recommended 
that patient satisfaction not be misinterpreted as a measure of clinical quality 
(Farley, 2014). (Manary, 2013) also reviewed the available literature to determine 
whether or not patients’ reports of their satisfaction with healthcare services are 
reflective of the quality of care. Their findings showed lack of consensus on the 
relationship between patient satisfaction and clinical quality, but they ultimately 





“robust, distinctive indicators of health care quality” (p. 203). However, their focus 
did not include specific measures of technical quality and identified items such as 
adherence, overall outcomes and physician-patient communication (Manary, 
2013). Additionally, they cited the flaws in using health plan data in some of the 
previous studies, and point to the challenges with timeliness of surveys provided 
by health plans or primary care physicians that often conduct surveys on an 
annual basis as reasoning for the findings that show lack of correlation (Manary, 
2013).  
(Chang, 2006) used a global rating of patient experience derived from the 
CAHPS survey to assess the relationship with quality as measured by the 
Assessing Care of Vulnerable Elders (“ACVE”) including 207 quality indicators. 
They found that better communication was associated with improved patient 
satisfaction, but that technical quality of care did not show statistically significant 
association with patient satisfaction global ratings (Chang, 2006). They 
recommended that “vulnerable elders’ global ratings of care not be used as a 
marker of technical quality of care” (p. 665). (Gandhi, 2002) attempted to create a 
report card for the ambulatory environment since the concept was prevalent with 
hospitals and health plans, but not with ambulatory clinics. In doing so, they used 
HEDIS-like measures such as “clinic function, patient satisfaction, diabetes 
guideline compliance and asthma guideline compliance” (Gandhi, et al 2002). As 
part of that process, they assessed the relationship between each of the five 
domains and found no significant correlation between any of the domains 





satisfaction and outcomes but noted that “more goes into satisfaction than just 
outcomes” (Kane, 1997) p. 714. However, their study was limited to surgical 
patients undergoing a cholecystectomy. Of note, is that this study relied on 
patient interviews before surgery and at 6 months post-surgery, focusing on 
health status at the baseline interview and satisfaction as well as health 
outcomes at the follow-up interview (Kane, 1997).  
Another study that focused on surgical quality and hospital care showed 
that hospitals with higher patient satisfaction scores were those hospitals that 
provided more efficient care and had higher surgical quality (Tsai, 2015). For 
their study, they used the Hospital Consumer Assessment of Healthcare 
Providers and Systems (“HCAHPS”) survey combined with Medicare data on 6 
common surgical procedures to measure efficiency and quality, including items 
such as length of stay, mortality rate and readmission rate (Tsai, 2015). Another 
study, though not based in the United States, showed an inverse relationship 
between quality of care and patient satisfaction (Hutchison, 2003). While their 
study focused on the ambulatory environment, quality was measured by quality 
of care criteria created by an expert review panel for 8 common acute conditions 
and responses to satisfaction questionnaires that focused on communication, the 
physician’s attitude and wait-time (Hutchison, 2003). And, others have reviewed 
the literature and determined that “research leaves open if patient experiences 
with received care can serve as a valid quality indicator which should be utilized 





 As of the time of this writing, there are two (2) known studies that assess 
patient satisfaction results as it relates to quality metrics using patient satisfaction 
survey and HEDIS (quality) results in an ambulatory environment. However, each 
of these studies uses health plan data for the analysis. 
 Schneider, et al (2001) assessed the relationship between health plan 
enrollee responses to the Consumer Assessment of Health Plans Survey 
2.0 and clinical quality using a national sample of 233 Medicare health 
plans’ HEDIS results from 1998. Thus, this study assessed patient 
satisfaction with their care as it relates to the health plan versus a provider 
specific survey. Schneider, et al (2001) used five composite measures and 
four ratings from the Consumer Assessment of Health Plans Survey; and 
six HEDIS measures for their assessment. Specifically, they grouped the 
Consumer Assessment of Health Plans Survey results into reporting 
composites based on the domain that the response most closely 
represented. The five composites ultimately included: “getting needed 
care”, “getting care quickly”, “health plan information and customer 
service”, “courtesy and respect of doctor’s office staff” and 
“communication with providers” (Schneider, et al, 2001) p. 1325. And, 
elements assessing the doctor-patient relationship as well as enrollees’ 
average ambulatory use were included (Schneider, et al, 2001). The 
HEDIS health plan performance rates from 1998 included in the study 
were: the proportion of eligibly women that had their mammogram, the 





exam, the proportion of patients that had a myocardial infarction (heart 
attack) that were treated with a beta blocker, the proportion of patients that 
had a cardiovascular event such as myocardial infarction or cardiac 
revascularization that had a serum low density lipoprotein (“LDL”) test 
done, the proportion of patient admitted to the hospital for a mental health 
condition that had follow-up within 30 days of hospitalization, the 
proportion of patients diagnosed with a mental health condition that had 
effective continuation of antidepressant medications (Schneider, et al 
2001). The study was performed using heath plan data and perspective, 
thus its approach differs from this research. Linear regression was used to 
assess the relationship between specific Consumer Assessment of Health 
Plans Survey composites and specific HEDIS measure results as opposed 
to an overall rating of patient satisfaction and quality. The researchers did 
identify a pattern of associations in the measures that they interpreted as 
suggestive of the Consumer Assessment of Health Plan Survey (patient 
satisfaction) and HEDIS (quality) measures being complementary in that 
two of the Consumer Assessment of Health Plan Survey composites were 
consistently associated with most HEDIS measures, those being 
“enrollees’ experience with obtaining needed care” and “enrollees’ 
experience obtaining information and customer service from their health 
plan” (Schneider, 2001). However, they also found that the Consumer 
Assessment of Health Plans Survey global rating as measured by the 





results, showing that patients’ overall satisfaction with their care and their 
health plan were not associated with the health plan’s performance on 
HEDIS results. 
 Sequist, et al (2008) assessed the association between clinical quality 
using HEDIS measures and patient experience using the Ambulatory Care 
Experiences Survey (“ACES”) using data from 373 practice sites and 119 
individual primary care physicians in the state of Massachusetts. The 
authors created three composites from the HEDIS results, two that 
addressed processes of care (preventive measures and disease 
management) and one that addressed outcomes (Sequist, et al, 2008). 
Seven composites from the ACES results were created that included 
“doctor-patient communication”, “clinical team interactions”, “health 
promotion and support”, “integration of care”, “office staff”, “visit-based 
continuity” and “organizational access” (Sequist, et al, 2008 p. 1787). 
Their analysis was based on Spearman correlation coefficients where they 
calculated Spearman correlation coefficients between the HEDIS quality 
composites and the ACES patient satisfaction composites. Much like 
Schneider, et al (2001), the data used was obtained from health plan 
reported information as opposed to provider specific. Data collected in this 
manner are primarily claims based in nature and/or include some 
component of medical record review by the health plan (Sequist, et al, 
2008). However, Sequist, et al (2008) were able to calculate the HEDIS 





Sequist, et al (2008) used a different patient satisfaction survey tool 
(ACES) than Schneider, et al (2001), they were similar in that they were 
both health plan administered. The authors showed an “absence of 
overwhelmingly strong correlations” (Sequist, et al, 2008 p. 1788) between 
patient satisfaction results and clinical quality metrics and deduced that 
clinical quality and patient satisfaction “represent sufficiently distinct 
activities” (Sequist, et al, 2008 p. 1788). And further, they stated “patients 
using such data to select a primary care physician may need to make 
trade-offs between technical performance and interpersonal performance” 
(Sequist, et al, 2008 p. 1788). 
Each of these studies ultimately found that satisfaction has limited if any 
correlation with quality as measured by HEDIS metrics, the most commonly used 
quality metrics in an ambulatory environment (Fenton, 2012). Overall, data and 
evidence of the relationship between patient satisfaction results and individual 
physician performance on quality measures remains ill-defined. Additionally, the 
only available research has been conducted using health plan data as opposed 
to provider data. This research extends the currently available research by 
studying the correlation between patient satisfaction and clinical quality using a 
physician organization’s quality data set and patient satisfaction results as well 
as using a more robust set of metrics and physician characteristics and 
demographics. To our knowledge, this is the first study to use physician 
organization data in this manner, primarily because of the relative infancy of 







3.1 RESEARCH DESIGN 
Data will be obtained from a regional physician hospital organization (“PHO”) 
in northeast Ohio. In 2011, the PHO implemented an integrated EHR across all 
of its physician practices; and in 2012 it designed and implemented a physician 
performance bonus program in efforts to begin linking physician reimbursement 
to quality and patient satisfaction metrics. The PHO consists of approximately 
120 physicians across various specialties, with a strong primary care base. For 
purposes of this study, the PHO’s clinical quality database from calendar year 
2013 will be utilized and linked with its patient satisfaction database and 
physician demographics. The clinical quality metrics database includes 27 
HEDIS measures that were included in the performance bonus program for 
calendar year 2013. Patient Satisfaction results include patient responses to the 
Clinician and Groups (“CG”)-CAHPS survey (attached as Exhibit 1) received 
during the calendar year, 2013 for the PHO physicians. Because the majority of 
the HEDIS measures included in the PHO’s performance bonus program apply 
exclusively to primary care physicians, the study was limited to family medicine, 
internal medicine, pediatric and gynecology physicians.  
This study’s focus is patient satisfaction as expressed by patient ranking of 
their physician on a scale of 1-10, 10 being the highest and its connection to 
physician performance on quality metrics as measured by individual physician 





Previous studies have mostly used claims based data. Patient identifiable 
information is not provided. Every patient satisfaction response received during 
calendar year 2013 was included so long as there was corresponding quality 
performance data for the designated physician. Thus, individual patients may be 
represented more than one time if they had multiple physician visits within the 
time period and responded to the patient satisfaction survey more than once. In 
administration of the patient satisfaction survey, the PHO issued a survey to 
every patient with an email address on file each time they had an office visit at 
one of the participating practices. For those patients without an email address on 
file, a monthly random selection of patients was identified to receive a hard-copy, 
mailed survey. The results of the electronic surveys and paper surveys were 
combined by scanning the paper surveys through a character recognition 
program and including them in the electronic database. Due to the nature of the 
survey process, those patients that visit the doctor more frequently or see more 
doctors within the PHO network would have more opportunities to respond to a 
survey and may be represented in the data more than once. Further, patients 
that responded more than once may have different results for each response. 
During the time period, the response rate to the survey was 12%. Though this 
may be considered a low response rate for surveys in general, relative to patient 
satisfaction in healthcare, it is slightly above the average of 11% (Scaletta, 2015). 
Further, a limitation of this data is the fact that the data is limited to physicians 





3.2 DATA SOURCES 
Data from the PHO’s patient satisfaction database include patient level 
responses to the CG-CAHPS 6 point questionnaire during calendar year 2013 by 
physician with corresponding patient age, gender, race/ethnicity, city of residence 
and insurance status expressed as Commercial, Medicare, Medicaid or self-pay. 
City of residence will be used to supplement the database with median 
household income by city of residence. The database contains 4,617 responses 
for the time period, of which 3,017 are for PCPs. The overall physician rating is 
the focus of this research and is reflected by the score on the following question 
from the CG-CAHPS survey: “Using any number from 1 to 10, where 1 is the 
worst doctor possible and 10 is the best doctor possible, what number would you 
use to rate this doctor?”  
 This data will be paired with the PHO’s clinical quality metric database 
which includes physician performance on designated HEDIS measures. The data 
is not matched to the patient level, i.e. it cannot be determined whether an 
individual physician met a certain quality measure for a specific patient that 
responded to the patient satisfaction results. Thus, the individual physician is the 
data element that links the patient satisfaction and quality measures. The total 
physician quality measure score is included for each patient satisfaction 
response for that physician and performance for each individual quality metric 
are also available. For the 2013 performance year, there were 27 clinical 
measures applicable to the PCPs in the PHO. However, not every measure is 





physician in the data set with the specialty of Internal Medicine, Family Medicine, 
Pediatrics or Gynecology. Specialists were excluded due to the scarcity of clinical 
quality metrics applicable to them. For purposes of exclusions, specialists were 
defined as any physician with a primary specialty other than Internal Medicine, 
Family Medicine, Pediatrics or Gynecology. 
  Table 1 reflects the measures and the thresholds that physicians were 
required to meet as part of the performance bonus program. The measures were 
selected based on the PHO’s contracts with the three major payers in their 
market. These measures represent the HEDIS measures that are incorporated 
into the PHO’s payer contracts as quality metrics that they are accountable for 
under the terms of their pay for performance program. The threshold is payer 
stipulated based on HEDIS methodologies which includes a regional adjustment 
(The National Committee for Quality Assurance, 2015). As part of their NCQA 
accreditation, health plans/payers are required to submit data on their provider 
network’s performance on certain HEDIS measures. Thus, NCQA has a 
benchmark and threshold system for rating health plan performance. According 
to NCQA “As described in the Standards and Guidelines for the Accreditation of 
Health Plans, NCQA requires organizations to submit specified HEDIS measures 
and CAHPS 5.0H survey results annually. NCQA determines the HEDIS 
measure portion of the score by comparing organization results with a national 
benchmark (the 90th percentile of national results) and with regional and national 
thresholds (the 75th, 50th and 25th percentiles). NCQA uses the higher of two 





national thresholds, or the result based on comparison with national thresholds”. 
For example,  
Figure 3 represents the NCQA scoring for cervical cancer screening. The payer 
defined benchmark for this measure for the PHO was 76%, which is above the 
50th percentile for the PHO’s region (5) and is at the 50th percentile for national 
(The National Committee for Quality Assurance, 2015). The 90th percentile at the 
regional level is not reported by NCQA. 
 
Figure 3 
Source: NCQA, 2015 
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HEDIS Clinical Quality Metrics 
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Physician demographic and productivity factors will be made available from 
the PHO for linking with the patient satisfaction and clinical quality metrics data. 
Based on the individual physician, the demographic information will be added to 
the database. The physician demographic and productivity factors available 
include: physician age, physician gender, physician race/ethnicity, physician 
specialty, physician degree (MD/DO), physician medical school ranking, 
physician board certification status, physician wRVUs for the calendar year 2013 
and total visit volume by facility for calendar year 2013. Previous studies have 
not included physician characteristics in their analysis. 
3.3 STUDY SAMPLE 
The study sample includes all responses to the PHO issued CG-CAHPS 
survey that were received in calendar year 2013 where the physician of record 
had clinical quality performance data available for calendar year 2013 and the 
physicians’ specialty was one of the designated primary care physician 
specialties. There are a total of 3016 observations, producing a power estimate 
of 99.99%. This sample was chosen because of the number of observations and 
extensive quality metrics.  
3.4 MEASUREMENT OF VARIABLES 
 3.4.1 PRIMARY OUTCOME MEASURE 
For each model, the primary outcome measure will be the patient rating of 
physician score as provided on the CG-CAHPS survey. This response is 
provided on a scale of 1-10, 1 being the worst physician and 10 being the best. 
The CG-CAHPS survey is a tool created by the Agency for Healthcare Research 





been found that “The CG-CAHPS Adult Survey has acceptable psychometric 
properties at the individual level and practice site level. The analyses suggest 
that the survey items are measuring their intended concepts and yield reliable 
information” (Dyer, 2012). Further, the global rating of the doctor variable has 
been found to be positively and significantly correlated with the composites of the 
CG-CAHPS survey (Dyer, 2012). The overall doctor rating question with a 
scaling of 1-10 is an ordinal variable.  
 3.4.2 COVARIATES 
Covariates will be selected from the available data and will be based on 
those variables that are perceived to have an impact on patient satisfaction. The 
primary variables of interest are P4P score (composite of all clinical quality 
metrics), wRVU, which provides information on how busy the doctor is 
individually and office visit volume which shows the size and volume of an 
individual office location. Other covariates were included as controls, specifically 
those around physician and patient characteristics and demographics. The data 
set will be supplemented with the medical school ranking for each physician’s 
medical school as provided by StartClass, which ranks medical schools based on 
factors such as median Medical College Admissions Test score for admitted 
students, median grade point average of admitted students, acceptance rate, 
total enrollment and other factors. Additionally, the median household income of 
the patients’ city of residence will be included using data from the US Census 
bureau. The composite performance score on the clinical quality metrics was 





on clinical quality measures and patient satisfaction. The composite score for 
quality metrics is the average of each individual physician’s performance on the 
measures applicable to their specialty. In model 2, a composite score of the 3 
antibiotic related measures will be added as shown in  
Table 4 since antibiotic prescribing is often cited as one of the detrimental 
effects of asymmetric information when physicians’ compensation is tied to 
patient satisfaction. Table 2 reflects the covariates included in model 1 and Table 
3 reflects the covariates included in model 2. Models 3-6 will mirror model 2 with 
the exception of replacing the antibiotic composite with each of the other 
composite measures as shown in Table 6. 
Table 2 
Model 1 Variables 
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3.6 STATISTICAL ANALYSIS 
Cross-sectional regression analysis will be conducted using the data from 
calendar year 2013 assessing the dependent variable (patient satisfaction 
rating), patient and physician related variables as shown in Table 2 and Table 3 
in order to test the null hypotheses. The dependent variable will be the response 
to “Using any number from 1 to 10, where 1 is the worst doctor possible and 10 is 
the best doctor possible, what number would you use to rate this doctor?” by 
doctor from the CG-CAHPS survey. Predictor variables will be assessed by using 
multiple linear regression models to measure effect. Multiple linear regression 





weighted) for performance on clinical quality metrics as a predictor variable. This 
composite score includes all measures applicable to each physician’s specialty.  
Multiple linear regression model 2 will include the composite score 
(average of individual scores, equally weighted) for performance on only the 3 
clinical quality measures related to antibiotic prescribing as shown in Table 4. 
Antibiotic prescribing practices are particularly relevant to this analysis because 
of the issue of asymmetric information. Patients often go to their doctor seeking 
antibiotics to feel better, but only the physician has the knowledge to determine 
whether or not an antibiotic will be useful in the patient’s treatment plan. Since 
antibiotics are used for bacterial infections and are not useful in viral infections, 
the physician must first assess whether the patient has a viral or bacterial 
infection. If the patient has a virus, an antibiotic is not needed, but there often 
isn’t a solution for the patient other than to “wait it out” and rest. Patients are thus 
more inclined to prefer an antibiotic as compared to no treatment, particularly 
since they do not have the knowledge to know whether their condition is viral or 
bacterial. One of the major criticisms of compensating physicians based on 
patient satisfaction has to do with this very issue—physicians are incentivized to 
increase patient satisfaction but the things that improve patient satisfaction, such 
as receiving antibiotics to help their illness, may not be in their best interest. 
Physicians are left in a quandary of whether to prescribe an antibiotic when it 
may not be necessary, but keeps the patient happy versus upsetting the patient 





Multiple linear regression models 3-6 will include one of each of the 
remaining composite scores to assess the impact of each type of quality 
measure. Specifically, composites will be created for vaccine adherence, 
antibiotic usage, preventive services, chronic condition management and generic 
prescribing as delineated in Table 5. 
Table 4 
Antibiotic Measures 
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Measure Composite Group 
Appropriate Testing for Children with Pharyngitis Antibiotics 
Appropriate Antibiotic use with Acute Bronchitis Antibiotics 
Treatment for Children with Upper Respiratory 
Infection (“URI”) Antibiotics 
Diabetes Care - HbA1C Chronic Condition 
Diabetes Care - LDL - C Chronic Condition 
Diabetes Care - Nephropathy Screening 
Chronic Condition 
Diabetes Care - Eye Exam Chronic Condition 
Lipid Screening - Cardiac Conditions 
Chronic Condition 
Annual Monitoring of Persistent Medications: 
Anticonvulsants Chronic Condition 
Annual Monitoring of Persistent Medications: Digoxin 
Chronic Condition 
Annual Monitoring of Persistent Medications: 
Diuretics Chronic Condition 
Appropriate Asthma Medicines Chronic Condition 
Beta Blocker after Acute Myocardial Infarction 
(“AMI”) Chronic Condition 
Beta Blocker for Heart Failure Chronic Condition 
Generic Dispensing Rate Generics 
Blood Pressure (“BP”) Measurement 
Preventive  
Tobacco Use Status Preventive  
Well Child Visits Preventive  
Annual Preventive Visit Preventive  
Breast Cancer Screening Preventive  
Colorectal Cancer Screening Preventive  
Cervical Cancer Screening  Preventive  
Osteoporosis Management Preventive  
Glaucoma Screening Preventive  
Childhood Immunizations – Measles, Mumps, 
Rubella (“MMR”) 
Vaccine 
Childhood Immunizations - Varicella 
Vaccine 
 
 For this analysis, p-values less than .05 will be considered to be of 






We analyzed between 1849-2944 patient satisfaction observations, 
depending on the model, along with PCP performance on HEDIS quality metrics 
from calendar year 2013 for a regional PHO in northeast Ohio using Stata® 
version 13.1. The mean overall patient satisfaction rating was 9.54 (scale 1-10) 
and mean overall PCP quality score was 74.74%. There were 44 PCPs 
represented in the data, 24 osteopathic and 20 allopathic; 15 females and 29 
males. Ordinary least squares (“OLS”) regression was used to determine 
whether overall quality or certain quality composites were predictors of patient 
satisfaction (“DoctorRating”). The mean patient satisfaction score was high and 
had a very high frequency of ratings of either 9 or 10 (89.1% of respondents 
rated their doctor using a “9” or “10”). Therefore, transformation of the 
DoctorRating variable was attempted by grouping scores of 1-4 into one score 
and retaining scores of 5-10. Using this grouped variable, the models were 
attempted using ordered probit regression. However, there was not a significant 
difference in the results between models and the r-squared values were higher 
using OLS and the ungrouped DoctorRating variable. Thus OLS was used for all 
models. 
 In all six models, our null hypothesis was that there is not a relationship 
between patient satisfaction and the clinical performance metric being tested 
versus the alternative that there is a relationship between patient satisfaction and 
performance on the clinical quality metric being tested, though in models 1 and 4 





4.1 MODEL ONE: OVERALL QUALITY COMPOSITE 
We predicted that overall, patients would not be more satisfied with 
physicians that performed better on clinical quality metrics due to issues of 
information asymmetry; and that patient satisfaction and clinical quality are 
distinct, unrelated domains, which represents the null hypothesis in this model 
that there is no relationship between overall clinical quality and patient 
satisfaction. Table 6 reflects the results of this model: 
Table 6 
OLS Results: Overall Quality Score Model- Hypothesis 1 
Number of obs:  2944 
F(19, 2924): 3.80 
Prob > F: 0.0000 
R-squared: 0.0310 







As shown, we did not find a statistically significant relationship between 
DoctorRating and clinical quality (“QualityScore”) with a p-value of .190 and 
therefore fail to reject our null hypothesis that the two are unrelated, distinct 
domains. Additionally, the r-squared value of .0310 shows that only 3.1% of the 
variance in DoctorRating is predicted by the model. Multiple regression 
diagnostics were performed and ultimately, the Breusch-Pagan and White’s tests 
showed evidence of heteroscedasticity in model 1. Because heteroscedasticity 
was detected in the model, HC3 robust standard errors were used. Control 
variables that were shown to be significant predictors of patient satisfaction rating 
include (p-values in parentheses) medical school ranking (.001), median 
household income of the patient’s city (.009), patient race of Hispanic (.012) and 
patient age (.000). All statistically significant variables had a positive association 
with DoctorRating with the exception of median household income of the 
patient’s city of residence, which is negatively associated with Doctor Rating, 
meaning that those patients that reside in cities with lower household incomes 
are more satisfied with their physician overall, after controlling for insurance 
status, race, age, gender and other factors. However, the coefficient is near zero. 
The statistically significant and positively correlated variables indicate that 
patients are more satisfied with physicians that attended a higher ranked medical 
school, Hispanic patients are more satisfied with their physicians as compared to 
Caucasian patients and patients’ satisfaction with their physician increases as 





the .05 level (.051). However, it was statistically significant in other models, 
indicating a potential relationship with patient satisfaction. 
4.2 MODEL TWO: ANTIBIOTIC COMPOSITE 
Our second model centered on the detrimental impacts of reimbursing 
physicians for patient satisfaction. Critics cite prescribing antibiotics as one of the 
major areas where there is asymmetric information, i.e. the patient desires to be 
prescribed an antibiotic to cure their condition, but they don’t have the knowledge 
to know whether or not an antibiotic is an effective treatment for their condition- 
only the physician has this knowledge. And, oftentimes taking an antibiotic can 
be detrimental to the patient’s health and to the general health of the public 
(antibiotic resistant bacteria). Thus, the argument is that if physicians are 
incentivized to improve patient satisfaction, they may inappropriately prescribe 
antibiotics in order to keep patients happy, even though there are negative health 
consequences. Because there were three HEDIS measures related to antibiotic 
prescribing practices, we were able to test our hypothesis that there is no 
relationship between patient satisfaction and performance on antibiotic 
prescribing measures against the null hypothesis that there is an inverse 
relationship between antibiotic prescribing practices and patient satisfaction by 
using the antibiotic prescribing composite (“ABX”) as a measure in model two of 












OLS Results: Antibiotics Composite Model- Hypothesis 2 
 
Number of obs:  2787 
F(19, 2924): 5.66 
Prob > F: 0.0000 
R-squared: 0.0374 
Adj R-squared 0.0308 
Root MSE 1.0634 
 
 
 As shown in Table 7, there was not a statistically significant relationship 
(.081) between patient satisfaction rating and the antibiotic prescribing 
composite, ABX. Thus, we fail to reject our null hypothesis that there is no 
relationship between patient satisfaction rating and antibiotic prescribing 
performance. Based on this study, it appears that antibiotic prescribing practices 





medical school ranking and patient age remain statistically significant and 
positive predictors of patient satisfaction, though the coefficient of both is near 
zero. Also similar to model one, median household income of the patient’s city of 
residence is still statistically significant and negatively associated with patient 
satisfaction rating in this model. However, the coefficient remains near zero. 
Unlike model one, physician gender is a statistically significant predictor (.000) of 
patient satisfaction rating with a positive relationship meaning that patients are 
more satisfied with male PCPs after controlling for other factors. There was no 
evidence of heteroscedasticity in this model or any of the following models, so 
robust standard errors were not used. The adjusted R-squared of this model was 
.0308, meaning 3.08% of the variance in DoctorRating was predicted by the 
model. 
4.3 MODEL THREE: PREVENTIVE MEASURE COMPOSITE 
 In our third model, we predicted that patients are more satisfied with 
physicians that perform better on preventive healthcare quality metrics because 
preventive reminders serve as a signal of quality by showing interest in the 
patient’s well-being and are less difficult to understand as opposed to our null 
hypothesis that there is no relationship between performance on preventive 
measures and patient satisfaction. Table 8 depicts the results of our analysis 
using the preventive measure composite (“Preventive”).  
 The Preventive composite was not significant at the .05 level (.063). 
Therefore, we fail to reject the null hypothesis that there is no relationship 





in models one and two, medical school rank (.003) and patient age (.000) are 
both statistically significant and positively associated with Preventive. Also like 
the previous models, median income of the patient’s city continues to be 
statistically significant and negatively associated with patient satisfaction, yet the 
coefficient is near zero. In this model, as well as model two, provider gender of 
male (.000) is statistically significant and positively associated with patient 
satisfaction. Adjusted r-squared for model three was .0310, indicating 3.1% of the 
variance in DoctorRating is accounted for within the model. 
 
Table 8 








4.4 MODEL FOUR: CHRONIC CARE COMPOSITE 
 For our fourth model, we predicted that patients are unable to ascertain 
the technical quality related to chronic condition management and thus there is 
no relationship between chronic disease management metrics and patient 
satisfaction, versus the alternative hypothesis that there is a relationship between 
patient satisfaction and performance on chronic disease metrics. Chronic 
conditions and their labs, medications and other treatments are more complex to 
understand and therefore, patients may not be able to determine clinical quality. 
Table 9 shows the overall results of this model. 
 For model four, as predicted, we fail to reject our null hypothesis that there 
is no relationship between performance on chronic care metrics and patient 
satisfaction. The chronic care composite (“ChronicCare”) was not statistically 
significant (.328) and was thus unrelated to patient satisfaction in this model. Like 
previous models, medical school rank, provider gender of male and patient age 
were all statistically significant and positively associated with patient satisfaction; 
and the median household income of the patient’s city was statistically significant 
and negatively associated with patient satisfaction, though the coefficient 
remained near zero. Where being an allopathic physicians was borderline 
significant in previous models, it is now statistically significant in this model (.015) 
and positively associated with patient satisfaction indicating that patients are 
more satisfied overall with allopathic PCPs as compared to osteopathic PCPs. 










4.5 MODEL FIVE: GENERIC PRESCRIBING METRIC 
Model five in this analysis was unique in that it included the metric for 
generic prescribing practices. It is the only model that includes a specific metric 
that directly impacts patients financially outside of office copays and coinsurance. 
If a physician performs well on the generic prescribing measure, patients’ out-of-
pockets expenses are reduced and would likely contribute to their overall 
satisfaction with their PCP. For that reason, we predicted that patients are more 





because it reduces their out of pocket expense. Again, our null hypothesis was 
that there is no relationship between patient satisfaction and generic prescribing. 
Table 10 reflects the outcomes of that analysis: 
Table 10 




 As predicted, generic prescribing (“Generics”) was statistically significant 
(.040) and positively associated with patient satisfaction, thus we reject our null 
hypothesis in favor of the alternative hypothesis that patients are more satisfied 
with physicians that perform better on generic prescribing measures. As in 





and patient age (.000) were statistically significant and positively associated with 
patient satisfaction; and median household income of the patient’s city of 
residence continues to be statistically significant and negatively associated with 
patient satisfaction, although the coefficient remains near zero. Adjusted R-
squared continues to be approximately 3% as in the previous models. 
4.6 MODEL SIX: VACCINATION COMPOSITE 
 In the sixth and final model, we used a composite of the vaccine measures 
(“Vaccine”) to assess the relationship with patient satisfaction. Much like 
preventive measures, we predicted that patients are more satisfied with 
physicians that perform better on vaccine related healthcare quality metrics 
because vaccination reminders and administration serve as a signal of quality by 
showing interest in the patient’s well-being and are less difficult to understand. 
Again, our null hypothesis was that there is not a relationship between 
vaccination administration performance and patient satisfaction. Table 11shows 
the detailed results. 
 The composite for vaccine was statistically significant (.012) and positively 
associated with patient satisfaction, meaning patients were more satisfied with 
PCPs that performed better on vaccine administration quality metrics. Therefore, 
we reject our null hypothesis that there is no relationship between patient 
satisfaction and vaccination administration performance in favor of the alternative 
hypothesis that “patients are more satisfied with physicians that perform better on 
vaccine related healthcare quality metrics”. Because this composite was limited 





run to verify that results were similar in this sample. All significant results were 




OLS Results: Vaccination Model- Hypothesis 6 
 
 
 As in previous models, medical school rank (.035), provider gender of 
male (.001) and patient age (.000) were statistically significant and positively 
associated with patient satisfaction; and median household income of the 
patient’s city of residence (.003) continued to be statistically significant and 





significant in this model, unlike the others and was negatively associated with 
patient satisfaction. Interestingly, visit volume, meaning the volume of office visits 
at the location where the patient was seen, was statistically significant in this 
model and was positively associated with patient satisfaction. The interpretation 
of this would be that patients are more satisfied with PCPs at higher volume 
office locations, which is somewhat surprising. However, the coefficient is near 
zero and the relationship was not positive in any of the other models. 
4.7 SUMMARY RESULTS 
Table 12 shows summary results for statistical significance across all six 
models. “N” represents no statistically significant relationship; and “+” or “-” 
represents the sign of the coefficient where there is a statistically significant 
relationship. The summary table clearly shows the statistically significant and 
positive relationship across all six models between medical school rank and 
patient satisfaction and between patient age and patient satisfaction. These 
results indicate that patients are more satisfied with PCPs that attended higher 
ranked medical schools; and patients become more satisfied with their PCP as 
they age. Additionally, in five of the six models, provider gender of male was 
statistically significant and positively associated with patient satisfaction, 
indicating patients are more satisfied with male PCPs as compared to females 
even after controlling for the gender of the patient and other factors. Patient race 
of Hispanic (as compared to Caucasian) and visit volume were each statistically 








Summary of Results Across Models 
 
 
Likewise, being an allopathic physician was statistically significant and positively 
associated with patient satisfaction in one model, but it was near the .05 
significance in four of the other models (p-values of .051, .074, .060 and .055). 
Based on the statistical significance in the chronic care model, it would appear 
that patients may be more satisfied with allopathic PCPs as compared to 
osteopathic PCP. Interestingly, wRVU which measures individual physician 
productivity and served as an indicator of how busy each physician was in this 
model, was not related to patient satisfaction; and as mentioned, visit volume, or 





showing significance in only one of six models. We do believe that our results are 
generalizable to the larger population since we used all satisfaction results 
received and the blends of PCP specialties, gender and other factors was robust. 
We have no reason to believe that the quality performance of the sample 








5.1 DISCUSSION OF RESULTS 
 As with previous studies assessing the relationship between patient 
satisfaction and clinical quality in an ambulatory setting (Sequist, 2008) 
(Schneider, 2001), our results are mixed. Unlike (Sequist, 2008) and (Schneider, 
2001), our analysis utilized individual patient satisfaction results to the CG-
CAHPS survey (as opposed to a health plan CAHPS survey) and used a more 
robust set of HEDIS measure results extracted from the provider EHR as 
opposed to claims based data from health plan(s). Both data sets were 
supplemented with physician and patient demographics and characteristics. In 
line with our first hypothesis, patient satisfaction global ratings were not found to 
be statistically significantly related to overall clinical quality as measured by a 
robust set of HEDIS metrics. Based on this result, it appears that clinical quality 
and patient satisfaction are separate domains and design of physician financial 
incentives should take this into account.  
 Our study did have a low adjust R2 across all models. This could be 
related to a number of factors. First, there are certain disciplines such as 
psychology and other social sciences that often have low adjusted R2 values 
because they predominantly assess or predict human behavior (Frost, 2013). In 
our study, we are trying to predict the drivers of patient satisfaction, which is 
directly based on human behavior and perception, which could certainly 
contribute to the low R2 values. Additionally, we likely haven’t captured all of the 





relationship between clinical quality and patient satisfaction, we did not include 
other predictors from the patient satisfaction survey that likely impact patient 
satisfaction such as the patient’s evaluation of whether a physician listened 
closely to them, explained things clearly; or whether the office staff were 
courteous and helpful, as examples. Including these other aspects of patient 
satisfaction may improve the overall R2 but would not offer additional contribution 
to our assessment of the relationship between clinical quality and patient 
satisfaction, particularly since previous studies have shown a positive 
relationship between overall rating of a physician and the other physician related 
metrics in the CG-CAHPS survey. However, further research should be 
conducted to explore the other predictors of overall patient satisfaction rating. 
 Our study contributed significantly to the available research with our 
analysis and findings assessing the relationship between antibiotic prescribing 
practices and patient satisfaction. Based on the underlying theory of asymmetric 
information, it is believed that patients lack the knowledge to understand when 
they need antibiotics and thus may prefer physicians that perform worse on 
antibiotic prescribing measures (those that prescribe antibiotics more often when 
it is not indicated). Physician critics argue that they are incentivized to prescribe 
antibiotics when not necessary so that they keep patients satisfied. Based on this 
theory, we hypothesized that the antibiotic composite and patient satisfaction 
would be negatively related, meaning patients would prefer those physicians that 
performed worse on antibiotic prescribing measures. However, our analysis 





practices and patient satisfaction. While the two are unrelated, there is not an 
inverse relationship as critics suspect related to issues of information asymmetry. 
This information is extremely helpful for guidance in designing effective incentive 
models and in explaining the usefulness of the measures to physicians. 
 Likewise, the two composites associated with preventive care and chronic 
care failed to show a statistically significant relationship to patient satisfaction, 
indicating again that clinical quality and patient satisfaction are separate, distinct 
domains. However, we hypothesized that preventive care would show a positive 
relationship due to preventive reminders serving as a signal of quality. This did 
not hold true. Upon further consideration, it may be that while preventive 
reminders serve as a signal for quality, they also include the less desirable 
testing that patients tend to delay and/or not comply with such as pap smears, 
mammograms and colonoscopies. Thus, performance on these metrics suffers 
but does not negatively impact patient satisfaction. Regarding chronic care 
metrics, we predicted that there would be no relationship between quality and 
patient satisfaction. Chronic care measures are complex and difficult for patients 
to understand, making them a challenging signal of quality to patients. Our 
prediction held true in the analysis, showing no significant relationship between 
chronic care metric performance and patient satisfaction. 
 We did identify two quality composites that were significantly related to 
patient satisfaction—the generic prescribing measure and the vaccine composite. 
We predicted that each of these measures would have a positive relationship 





impacts patients financially; and, much like preventive measures, vaccine 
administration would serve as a signal of quality to patients and/or their parents. 
Unlike the majority of preventive measures, vaccines can be administered 
directly in the physicians’ office, so the quality signal is not offset by delays in 
testing. Our hypotheses were confirmed in our analysis, generic prescribing 
performance was positive and statistically significantly associated with patient 
satisfaction. Further, the vaccine composite was also positive and statistically 
significantly associated with patient satisfaction.  
 Though not the focus of our study, several control variables did show 
repeated statistical significance with patient satisfaction across most or all 
models-- medical school ranking, provider gender of male, patient age (all 
positive associations) and median income of the patient’s city of residence 
(negative association). Because physician characteristics such as medical school 
attended are not normally available in the data sources used for this type of 
research, the medical school ranking has not been controlled for in previous 
analyses. Our research showed a positive and statistically significant association 
between medical school ranking and patient satisfaction across all six of our 
models. While it is difficult to make inferences about these results, it could be that 
higher ranked medical programs place more emphasis on training targeted at 
characteristics that improve patient satisfaction. Further, provider gender of male 
(as compared to female) was positive and statistically significant across five out 
of six of our models. This result shows a preference for male PCPs after 





patient satisfaction, indicating that as patients age, they are more satisfied with 
their PCP. This could be caused by multiple factors, including but not limited to 
length of time the patient has been seeing their PCP or increasing likelihood of 
health concerns as patients age. Lastly, median household income of the 
patient’s city of residence was negatively associated with patient satisfaction, 
meaning that patients who reside in lower income cities are more satisfied with 
their physicians after controlling for other factors. Of note is that control variables 
representing how busy the physician or their office location is (wRVU and Office 
Visit Volume) were not related to patient satisfaction, nor was physician board 
certification status. 
 Our results are practically important to those designing financial incentive 
models for physicians, particularly where patient satisfaction and clinical quality 
are both involved. It is clear from our analysis that metrics that have a direct 
financial impact on patients, such as generic prescribing; and metrics that are 
easy for patients to understand and can be performed directly in the physicians’ 
office are related to patient satisfaction. If an incentive program incorporates both 
patient satisfaction and clinical quality, those metrics that are related to patient 
satisfaction (i.e. where the patient is able to ascertain clinical quality) should be 
left out of incentive models in order to reduce complexity of the models and 
because patient satisfaction is already impacted by performance on those 
metrics. Further, for metrics where there is a negative relationship, the incentives 
may be in conflict, reducing the effectiveness of the incentive. The main concern 





We were unable to study pain medication prescribing, but the antibiotic concern 
appears unfounded in our analysis. Additional studies looking at the individual 
measures as opposed to composites would be helpful to further elucidate which 
metrics are related to patient satisfaction and thus could be eliminated or handled 
differently within incentive models due to redundancy or conflict. 
5.2 CONCLUSIONS 
 The majority of our evidence shows that patient satisfaction and clinical 
quality as measured by HEDIS metrics in an ambulatory setting are unrelated 
domains of healthcare service. Our study provides patient level satisfaction data 
and robust, provider based clinical metric performance results. Further, while we 
have shown that overall patient satisfaction and clinical quality are unrelated, 
there are certain metrics or groups of metrics that are statistically significant and 
related to patient satisfaction, specifically generic prescribing and vaccine 
administration. These metrics that are related to patient satisfaction are different 
from other quality metrics in that they either 1) directly impact the patient 
financially (generic prescribing) or 2) are an easily identifiable signal of quality to 
the patient, i.e. the doctor recommended vaccines to keep the child healthy and 
the vaccine could be administered in their office the same day. Other, more 
complex measures are more greatly impacted by asymmetric information and 
therefore are unrelated to quality.  
Additionally, while we conclude that patient satisfaction and clinical quality 
are separate domains overall, we also have shown that there is not an inverse 





often cited by critics of tying physician financial incentives to patient satisfaction 
results.  
Our finding that there is not a relationship between most clinical quality 
metrics and patient satisfaction is important to the effective design of provider 
incentives going forward. While both patient satisfaction and clinical quality are 
important they are mostly separate domains and financial incentives should be 
structured accordingly. However, there are certain metrics that appear to be 
related to patient satisfaction. These metrics, such as generic prescribing 
percentage and vaccine administration could be excluded from incentive 
programs because their performance is already accounted for in patient 
satisfaction measurement. On the contrary, if there are metrics that show an 
inverse relationship, the weight of the clinical quality metric should be increased 
to offset the impact of the inverse relationship and incentivize quality even at the 
cost of reduced satisfaction. Further studies that assess the relationship between 
individual metrics and patient satisfaction should be conducted in order to 
appropriately incentivize provider behavior.  
Overall, our findings show that from a policy perspective, performance 
incentives may be structured incorrectly. Physician reimbursement and incentive 
models are being structured and implemented without a clear understanding of 
their implications. Taking these findings into consideration and including this type 
of analysis in the design of incentives is important to driving our healthcare 
system to a more value based structure. Ultimately, policymakers, health plans 





evolving value based system should consider the different domains of healthcare 
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APPENDIX 2: SCHEDULE OF ABBREVIATIONS 
 
Appendix 2 
Schedule of Abbreviations 
Abbreviation Description 
ACA The Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act 
ACEI Angiotensin Converting Enzyme Inhibitors 
ACES Ambulatory Care Experiences Survey 
ACO or ACOs Accountable Care Organization(s) 
ACVE Assessing Care of Vulnerable Elders 
AHRQ The Agency for Healthcare Research and Quality 
AMI Acute Myocardial Infarction 
APM Alternative Payment Models 
ARB Angiotensin II Receptor Blockers 
BP Blood Pressure 
BUN Blood Urea Nitrogen Test 
CABG Coronary Artery Bypass Graft 
CAHPS Consumer Assessment of Healthcare Providers & Systems 
CHIP Children's Health Insurance Program 
CMS The Center for Medicare and Medicaid Services 
DO Doctor of Osteopathy 
EHR or EHRs Electronic Health Record(s) 
EP or EPs Eligible Professional(s) 
FFS Fee-For-Service 
FOBT Fecal Occult Blood Test 
FP Family Practice 
GDP Gross Domestic Product 
GYN Gynecology 
HbA1C Hemoglobin A1C Test 
HEDIS Healthcare Effectiveness Data and Information Set 
HHS The US Department of Health & Human Services 
HIE Health Insurance Experiment 
IM Internal Medicine 
LDL  Low Density Lipoprotein 
MACRA The Medicare Access and CHIP Reauthorization Act of 2015 
MD Medical Doctor 
MEI Medicare Economic Index 
MEPS Medical Expenditure Panel Survey 
MGMA The Medical Group Management Association 
MIPS Merit-Based Incentive Payment System 





MU Meaningful Use 
NBER The National Bureau of Economic Research 
NCQA The National Committee for Quality Assurance 
NHE National Health Expenditure 
OECD 
The Organization for Economic Cooperation and 
Development 
OLS Ordinary Least Squares 
PCI Percutaneous Coronary Intervention 
PCMH Patient Centered Medical Home 
PCP Primary Care Physician 
Peds Pediatrics 
PFS Physician Fee Schedule 
PHO Physician Hospital Organization 
PQRS Physician Quality Reporting System 
RBRVS Resource Based Relative Value Scale 
Rx Prescription 
SCP Specialty Care Physician 
SGR Sustainable Growth Rate 
URI Upper Respiratory Infection 
VBPM Value Based Payment Modifier 
VZV Varicella Zoster Vaccine (Chicken pox) 
wRVU Physician Work Relative Value Unit 
 
 
 
 
